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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to identify the driving forces of cross-border investments emanating from
Sovereign wealth funds and to test the existence of spatial competition among recipient countries.
For this, we develop an original econometric framework that quantifies the role of spatial dependence
in the location of investments, and that uses a modified version of the standard estimation procedure
of spatial panel model, which accommodates the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation of the
dependent variable. This transformation copes with two critical features of net capital flows,
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scale database, we provide evidence of negative spatial dependence, investments in one country
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“I don’t want European citizens to wake up in several months’ time and find that Euro-
pean companies belong to non-European capital, which bought at the share price’s lowest
point”
“This might be an opportunity to create our own sovereign wealth funds”
(October 21, 2008, N. Sarkozy (President of France) at the European Parliament)
1. Introduction
Increasing financial integration as materialized by the sustain rise in both cross-border capital
inflows and outflows has critically affected both advanced and emerging economies over the past
decades, leading the academic community to examine various facets of this component of global-
ization such as the impact of financial integration on economic growth or on financial stability to
cite a few. One remarkable feature of the recent years regarding international cross-border capital
flows has been the emergence of a novel actor, namely Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) which has
rapidly become a major force in financial markets worldwide. SWFs are public investment agencies
located for their vast majority in developing economies 1 which manage part of the assets owned by
national governments resulting from excess of exchange foreign reserves, oil or gas receipts as well
as trade surpluses. Whether or not capital flows emanating from these state-owned entities are in
the interest of the target country has been the object of heated debates within political circles and
the general public. As illustrated in the above quote from the former French President, Nicolas
Sarkozy, there have been long lasting fears and reluctance regarding the arrival of SWFs in local
markets mainly due to their lack of transparency as well as to the belief that those investments were
designed to exert political influence on target firms or countries and to access foreign technology.
Today, however, SWFs constitute a major source of capital for world economies with assets under
management amounting to $7.243 trillion, leading most governments as noted by Megginson and
Fotak (2014) to “court” SWF investments.
Given their increasing importance in advanced and emerging economies, the question of how
countries can attract capital flows emanating from SWFs has become of major importance. In
this paper, we propose to identify both country-level determinants and spatial interaction effects of
cross-border SWF net flows. In particular, we examine the existence of spatial competition among
recipient countries of SWF investments that is whether increased capitals received by one target
1Among the 79 SWFs listed in the SWF institute website in 2016 only 21 percent are located in developed
economies according to the taxonomy adopted by the United Nations; the rest of SWFs are located in developing
economies (67 percent) or transition economies (12 percent).
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country is on average at the expense of its neighbors. Documenting empirically the drivers of net
capital flows is not easy. Neither is the assessment of spatial effects, as it requires addressing a
set of important econometric issues. As we argue later in the paper, a careful treatment of these
issues is however critical to obtain reliable results. For these reasons, we develop in this analysis an
original econometric framework that allows (i) to explicitly model and to test the existence of spatial
dependence in investment location and (ii) to accommodate a well-known feature of cross-border
capitals: the presence of skewed distributions of net investment flows due to extreme values as well
as zero and negative net flows. Our procedure is then applied to an original large-scale database
containing SWF’s net flows to 43 countries including both advanced and emerging economies over
the 2004-2009 period.
Along with the surge in SWFs’ cross-border investments, there has been an increasing interest
in the literature in the determinants of SWFs’ investments either at the firm level or at the country
level. In the former case, the literature builds on existing evidence in corporate finance which
has shown that firm-level conditions, such as firm-size (market capitalization, sales), firm-specific
risk indicators (leverage, cash of firm, degree of financial constraint, analyst coverage, turnover)
as well as firm-performance (ROA, ROE, CAPEX, stock market return, dividend yield) are the
main drivers of firm attractiveness for capitals (Kotter and Lel, 2011; Fernandes, 2011; Avendano,
2010). With respect to these three criteria, Kotter and Lel (2011), Karolyi and Liao (2010) and
Avendano (2010) argue that SWFs tend to invest in large and poorly performing companies which
are financially and cash constrained. Beyond firm characteristics, macroeconomic factors along with
the financial and institutional factors of the target country have also been documented as important
in the decision process of SWF (see Chhaochharia and Laeven (2008) and Karolyi and Liao (2010)
among others). Hence, Knill et al. (2012) find that the decision to invest depends positively on
the correlation between the market return on the SWF and that on the target country’s national
market index, mitigating the role of risk diversification in the decision of investment. In the same
vein, Fotak et al. (2008) find that SWFs investments tend to be concentrated, especially in the
financial sector. Separating the decision to invest from the amount invested, Knill et al. (2012)
conclude that the economic and financial variables are important factors for explaining the former
but matter less in determining the size of investment.
One important dimension of SWFs decision which is absent from the above discussion pertains
to the international allocation of capital. Is there evidence of domestic or foreign equity bias? Do
cross-border investments concentrate in specific regions? And if so, why? These are examples of
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questions related to the spatial dimension of the portfolio allocation which have been discussed in
the literature on SWF without being fully addressed (Megginson et al., 2013). In what follows, we
review key elements of those discussions along with selected arguments regarding the specific role
of interactions in explaining capital investments flow among countries.
The primary remarkable feature regarding the spatial allocation of SWFs’ capitals lies in the
large share of foreign assets hold in their portfolio. Looking at investments made by 15 SWFs over
the period 1985-2011, Bortolotti et al. (2013) and Megginson et al. (2013) report that nearly 70%
are channeled outside the home country. These figures starkly contrast with those usually reported
for other categories of funds such as mutual funds or pension funds which exhibit very strong home
equity bias (Bortolotti et al., 2013; Megginson and Fotak, 2014). At least two explanations help
understand this feature. First, conversely to other types of funds, one of the primary missions of
SWF is to help its home country stabilize its wealth. Accordingly, cross-border investments are
used as a diversification device which mitigates the impact of domestic economic downturns on the
national wealth. Second, large demand in domestic assets could end up building financial bubbles
in local markets. This risk is particularly important for countries hosting SWFs as their economies
are often of small size compared to the amount under management.
Another interesting feature related to the spatial dimension of cross-border capitals pertains
to the concentration of SWF investments in specific regions, notably in western economies which
benefit from the lion’s share of international SWF capitals with more than 50 % of them (see
Megginson and Fotak (2014) and the Sovereign wealth fund institute). The rest is mainly invested in
emerging market economies with specific regions such as Asia-Pacific receiving large flows and others
such as Latin America being nearly absent from the map. Traditional arguments from the literature
on international asset allocation to explain this feature relate to restrictions on international capital
flows, institutional barriers or transaction costs. For instance, high transaction costs prevent from
widespread investments of capital across countries and in turn from optimal diversification of risk.
Regional concentration can also stem from the existence of privileged relationship between the home
and the target country. For instance, Knill et al. (2012) and Chhaochharia and Laeven (2008) show
that SWF tend to invest in countries with prevailing trade links. This feature is consistent with
former results from the literature on foreign direct investment and international asset allocation
which emphasize the critical role of symmetric information (cost) and familiarity in explaining the
spatial allocation of international investments (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010). Likewise, Hau (2001)
shows that investors overweight assets they know better in their portfolio such as those issued
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by firm located in a country they are more familiar with or by multinationals. Those arguments
have been more recently discussed within the frame of the behavioral finance theory in which
investors are assumed to be boundedly rational. Accordingly, they consider foreign markets as
more risky than they truly are, if they are located far away (Solnik, 2008), concentrating their
investments in regions in which they have either information advantage or perceived familiarity.
In a related context, Portes and Rey (2005) highlight the strong impact of the distance on cross-
border equity flows. To explain this result, they argue that informational asymmetries lead to
higher transaction costs between distant economies.2 Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) point out that
the very large impact of distance on asset holdings in Portes and Rey (2005) is the consequence
of the complementarity between trade in goods and trade in assets. As such, they show that
geographical distance, understood as transportation costs, affects asset holdings mainly through its
impact on trade in goods. So far, various proxies have been proposed in the literature to measure
the level of familiarity between investors and target firms or economies such as language, trade,
culture and geographic distance .
Spatial dependence in capital flows can also simply stem from well-documented economic and
financial interactions across world economies. As such, countries receiving capitals from SWFs are
open economies which trade with other partner countries or investing themselves in other countries.
Those economic and financial relationships create physical dependence across countries that can
make capital flows from SWFs in a given country to be complementary and then to depend on
what its neighbors receive. Such a complementarity in investments made in different countries has
been documented for instance in the literature on foreign direct investments (FDI) that specifically
concentrates on conditions of multinational enterprise (MNE) choice of location for their production
plan.
The above discussion suggests the existence of spatial dependence in aggregate flow of invest-
ments received by host countries. Whether this dependence is playing a significant role in practice
is still unknown. Neither is the actual sign of the spatial correlation as two opposite effects can
be at play. Hence, if the choice to invest in a country is primarily based upon information or
familiarity criteria, we do expect a positive sign: countries sharing similar characteristics should
attract SWFs’ capital more or less to the same extend. To illustrate this relationship, consider a
SWF deciding to incur search and informational costs for investing in a specific country. By doing
2Separating out cultural proximities from pure informational symmetries remains a challenge for the empirical
literature (Portes and Rey, 2005).
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so, the fund implicitly becomes more informed about countries having a similar profile to the target
country, thereby being also more likely to invest in these countries. Increased investments in one
country should therefore be positively correlated with investments in its neighborhood (viewed as
countries sharing similarities). Still, the sign of the relationship holds as long as countries are not
set in competition. If similar economies are set in competition the sign is reversed and the expected
spatial correlation should be negative due to a continuous reallocation or re-balancing mechanism
over time: an increase in the investment done in one country at time t comes at the expense of a
similar country.
Although the literature on SWF determinants has been important over the past decade (Knill
et al., 2012; Megginson et al., 2013), empirical studies have been silent on one critical aspect of
cross-border investments: the specific role of spatial interactions between host countries to explain
the capitals’ allocation. The present paper aims to fill the gap by assessing the effect of domestic
determinants and spatial interactions on sovereign funds capitals’ net flows. To this end, we adopt
the perspective of the host country. As such, we can identify the factors leading an economy to
attract more or less capitals emanating from SWFs while being agnostic upon their origin. This
approach is in line with a large strand of the literature on foreign direct investment (Yu and
Walsh, 2010; Kristja´nsdo´ttir, 2005; Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al., 2007) but departs from the traditional
bilateral approach often adopted in the SWF literature (Knill et al., 2012; Megginson et al., 2013).
Hence, our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, our approach is designed to
explicitly take into account interactions in SWF’s investment flows. As discussed above, there
are ample anecdotal and more formal evidence from both the academic literature and professional
commentators that SWF investments concentrate on specific geographic zones.3 Accordingly, we
conjecture that the amount flowing in and out a country is not independent from the amount
of capital attracted by neighboring countries, the neighborhood being alternatively defined by
geographic, cultural or economic proximity in this paper. To formally test the existence of spatial
interactions in SWFs investment net flows, we propose to rely on the recent developments of spatial
panel data models (Lee and Yu, 2010a,b, 2012). To the best of our knowledge, this approach
has never been used to analyze SWFs’ cross-border investments. The second contribution lies
in the treatment proposed to deal with the so-called problem of skewness in the distribution of
capital flows (Zhang, 2014, p.136). More specifically, the amount invested every year in target
3see www.swfinstitute.org/sovereignwealthmap.html
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countries exhibits extreme values but also null and negative values. To deal with the problem of
extreme values which can severely bias estimated parameters, the literature usually proposes to
apply a log-transformation (Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al., 2007). This step has the advantage to dampen
the dispersion in the data, and especially the outliers, but cannot deal with zero and negative
values. In this paper, we propose an original procedure to deal with this problem by using the
Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation of the dependent variable, developed by Johnson (1949)
and applied to econometrics by Burbidge et al. (1988), which allows, in addition to reduce the
skewness of the distribution and the impact of outliers, to take care of possible zeros and negative
values in the dependent variable. To the best of our knowledge, this transformation has never been
applied to spatial econometrics models. We contribute therefore to the literature by developing the
estimation procedure accordingly. Specifically, we derive the likelihood function that accommodates
the transformation and compute the associated matrices of impacts of a change of a regressor on
the dependent variable. Given the feature in the data it can deals with, there are obliviously many
research in macroeconomics and finance such as modeling of foreign direct investment and trade
that could benefit from this transformation and the associated estimation procedure we propose.
The reminder of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we present the spatial autoregressive model
with the IHS transformation. Section 3 provides some details regarding the data and Section 4
reports and discuss our empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Econometric methodology
In this contribution, the dependent variable is defined as the net flows of investments from
sovereigns funds in a given country and is highly skewed to the right (see Figure 1 and information
given in Section 3.1). To solve this problem of outliers which can severely bias the estimated
parameters of the model, the traditional approach consists in log-transforming the variable so
that the distribution of the transformed variable is closer to a normal distribution. However, in
our case, the dependent variable also takes on null and negative values. Different solutions have
been proposed in the literature to deal with the limits of standard log-transformation. Hence,
in the presence of positive and null values of the dependent variable (presence of zero flows for
instance), we can simply disregard the concerned observations. However, this approach may result
in substantial loss of information (Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007). An alternative solution consists
in adding an arbitrary value (typically 1) to the concerned observations and include a dummy in
the model for the modified values of the dependent variable (for further details, see Raballand,
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2003; Disdier and Head, 2008). However, the zero-flow dummy variable could be endogenous since
it depends on the value taken by the dependent variable. Besides, Linders and De Groot (2006)
critic the arbitrariness of the chosen value to replace zeros. Frankel et al. (1997) also indicates that
this transformation biases the least squares estimator. Another solution to deal with zero flows
would be to use a Tobit model (Eaton and Tamura, 1994). However, this approach might not be
suited for our case since in addition to zero investments, we also face negative values of net flows.
Hence, our dependent variable cannot be considered as left censored.
In this contribution, we rely on a different approach which consists in using an alternative
transformation to the logarithm. We apply the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) transformation to
the dependent variable. This IHS transformation, developed by Johnson (1949) and applied to
econometrics by Burbidge et al. (1988) has been used among others in the context of Engel curve
by Reynolds and Shonkwiler (1991); Yen and Jones (1997), to assess the impact of tax incentives on
savings by Pence (2006) and to studies aimed at explaining wealth (Kennickell and Sunden, 1997;
Carroll et al., 2003; Kapteyn and Panis, 2003). One of the advantages of the IHS transformation is
that it allows the dependent variable to take on both positive and null values but also accommodates
negative values while still dampening the outliers and is known to better handle extreme values
than the Box-Cox transformation (Burbidge et al., 1988).4 The IHS transformation applied to a
variable y is presented in equation (1).
ω(y) =
ln
(
θ0y + (θ
2
0y
2 + 1)0.5
)
θ0
= sinh−1(θ0y)/θ0. (1)
This transformation is defined for all values of the scaling parameter θ0. Besides, as it is
symmetric around 0, we consider only θ0 ≥ 0. Also, for large values of y, the IHS transformation
corresponds to a vertical displacement of the logarithm: ln
(
θ0y + (θ
2
0y
2 + 1)0.5
) ≈ ln 2θ0 + ln y.
It can thus be interpreted in exactly the same way as a standard logarithmic dependent variable
but unlike the logarithm, the IHS transformation is defined at zero and for negative values. As
θ0 approaches 0, the IHS transformation is linear for a larger proportion of its domain while it
approximates the logarithmic transformation in a larger proportion of its domain when θ0 is larger
(Pence, 2006). Finally, we note that ∂ω(y)/∂y = 1√
1+θ20y
2
.
4Bickel and Doksum (1981) extend the Box-Cox transformation so that it can also handle negative value, but this
transformation remains undefined when the variable takes on zero values. Also, John and Draper (1980) propose the
“modulus transformation”, another extension of the Box-Cox transformation, to address negative and zero values.
However, this modulus transformation is not scale invariant, to the contrary of the IHS transformation used here.
8
In this paper, we estimate a spatial panel data model with random effects. Our procedure
uses the approach developed by Mundlak (1978) and extended to spatial panel models by Debarsy
(2012) to correct for the possible correlation between individual effects and regressors.
The random effects specification is presented in equation (2).
ω(Y )nt = λ0Wnω(Y )nt +Xntβ0 + Unt t = 1, · · · , T
Unt = cn0 + Vnt
(2)
where Ynt is the vector of the dependent variable for the n individuals at period t and Xnt is the
matrix of exogenous regressors at period t of dimension n×K. The error term Unt is composed of
2 terms: cn0, the vector of individual effects and Vnt = (v1t, · · · , vnt), the vector of idiosyncratic
errors. We further have that Wn is a square matrix of dimension n modeling interactions between
observations. Its construction is discussed in Section 3. Finally, β0 is the vector of dimension k× 1
of unknown parameters to be estimated and λ0 is the unknown coefficient measuring the intensity
of interactions between observations, to be estimated.
Stacking model (2) for all periods, we obtain:
ω(Y )nT = λ0(IT ⊗Wn)ω(Y )nT +XnTβ0 + UnT
UnT = Zccn0 + VnT
(3)
with Zc = ιT ⊗In and where ιT is a unit column vector of dimension T . The variance-covariance
matrix of UnT is
ΩnT = (ιT ι
′
T ⊗ In)σ2c + σ2IT ⊗ In (4)
Using the results of Wansbeek and Kapteyn (1982), we can rewrite the var-cov matrix in (4) as
follows:
ΩnT = (Tσ
2
α + σ
2)(
1
T
ιT ι
′
T ⊗ In) + σ2(ET ⊗ In) (5)
where ET = IT − 1T ιT ι′T is the demeaning operator. We can finally write ΩnT = σ2ΣnT , with
ΣnT = φ
−1(
1
T
ιT ι
′
T ⊗ In) + (ET ⊗ In)
where φ = σ
2
(Tσ2c+σ
2)
. By using Breusch (1987) results, we compute Σ−1nT = φPW + QW and
|ΣnT | = φ−n, with PW = 1T ιT ι′T ⊗ In and QW = ET ⊗ In.
Asymptotic properties of this model have been developed by Lee and Yu (2012) and the as-
sumptions underlying these asymptotic properties for the QML estimator are reproduced below for
the sake of clarity.
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Assumption 1. Wn is a non-stochastic spatial weights matrix with zero diagonals
Assumption 2. The disturbances {vit}, i = 1, · · · , n and t = 1, · · · , T are i.i.d. across i and t
and normally distributed with zero mean, variance σ20 and E|vit|4+η for some η > 0.
Assumption 3. Sn(λ) = In − λWn is invertible for all λ ∈ Λ, where Λ is a compact interval.
Furthermore, λ0 is in the interior of Λ.
Assumption 4. The elements of Xnt are non-stochastic and bounded, uniformly in n and t. Also,
under the asymptotic setting in assumption 6, the limit of 1nT
∑T
t=1X
′
ntXnt exists and is nonsingu-
lar.
Assumption 5. Wn is uniformly bounded in both row and column sums in absolute value (for
short, UB). Also, Sn(λ)
−1 is UB, uniformly in λ ∈ Λ.
Assumption 6. n is large, where T can be finite or large.
Assumption 7. cn0 ∼ N(0, σ2c In) and Vnt are i.i.d. and independent of XnT . Also, cn0 is inde-
pendent of VnT .
Assumption 1 is a normalization assumption which simply states that an observation does not
interact with itself. Assumption 2 states the regularity conditions for the error term. It imposes
homoskedasticity of the error term, a necessary condition for the QMLE to be consistent (see Lin
and Lee, 2010). The invertibility condition in Assumption 3 guarantees the existence of equation (2).
Besides, Assumption 3 imposes the parameter space Λ to be a compact set.
Assumption 4 states that if explanatory variables are included in the model, they should be
uniformly bounded. Finally, Assumption 5 guarantees that spatial autocorrelation is limited to a
manageable degree (Lee and Yu, 2010a) while Assumption 7 is needed to avoid correlation between
independent variables and the error term. Defining γ = (θ, λ, β′, φ, σ2)′ and η = (θ, λ, β′)′, the
log-likelihood function associated to model (2) is written as:
lnL(γ) = −nT
2
ln(2pi)− nT
2
ln(σ2) +
n
2
lnφ
+ T ln |In − λWn| − 1
2
n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
[
ln(θ2y2it + 1)
]− 1
2σ2
U ′nT (η)Σ
−1
nTUnT (η) (6)
where UnT (η) = ω(Y )− λ(IT ⊗W )ω(Y )−Xβ.
Also, T ln |Sn(λ)| − 12
∑n
i=1
∑T
t=1 ln(θ
2y2it + 1) is the Jacobian of the transformation, composed
of two terms. T ln |Sn(λ)| refers to the classical term coming from the SAR specification while
−12
∑n
i=1
∑T
t=1 ln(θ
2y2it + 1) is the derivative of the transformed dependent variable with respect to
the original dependent variable.
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According to Mundlak (1978), the random effects model is a misspecified version of the fixed
effects model because it ignores the possible correlation between individual effects and regressors.
By controlling for this correlation, he shows that the coefficients of the random effects specification
are identical to those of the fixed effects model. He thus proposes to set an auxiliary regression
that will capture this possible correlation. As individual effects are time invariant, they should be
correlated with the permanent component of the regressors, namely their time-average.
Hence, Mundlak (1978) proposes to augment the random effects model with the time-mean of
independent variable to control for the possible correlation between individual effects and regressors.
Debarsy (2012) extends this approach to spatial panel data models. Adapting this approach to our
model, we get:
ω(Y )nt = λ0Wnω(Y )nt +Xntβ0 + X˜npi0 + Unt t = 1, · · · , T
Unt = αn0 + Vnt
(7)
where X˜ is the matrix of independent variables without the constant term, X˜n =
1
T
∑T
t=1 X˜nt
is the time average of X˜ for all individuals and αn0 ∼ IN(0, σ2α).
The presence of correlation between individual effects and independent variables can be assessed
by testing whether the hypothesis pi = 0 can be rejected, using for instance a Wald or likelihood
ratio test.
2.1. Model interpretation
Interpretation of the results in spatial model is not trivial. Model (2) is an implicit form model
estimated by maximum likelihood. However, in order to compute the impact of a change of a
regressor on the dependent variable, we need to rely on the reduced form of the model, which is
shown in equation (8).
ω(Y )nt = (In − λ0Wn)−1
[
K∑
k=1
Xnt,kβ0,k
]
+ (In − λ0Wn)−1Unt (8)
According to Pence (2006), two types of impacts can be computed from the reduced form of
a model with IHS-transformed dependent variable. Firstly, one can calculate the impacts of a
level change of the originally measured dependent variable due to a unit change in an explanatory
variable. In the context of spatial autoregressive models, the matrix of marginal impacts for the
kth determinant is
∂Ynt
∂X ′nt,k
=
∂Ynt
∂ω(Y )′nt
∂ω(Y )nt
∂X ′nt,k
=
∂Ynt
∂ω(Y )′nt
[
(In − λ0Wn)−1Inβ0,k
]
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Referring to Pence (2006), Ynt is the equivalent to the hyperbolic sine of ω(Y )nt. Hence, for
individual i at period t, we have:
yit =
1
2θ
[
eθ0ω(y)it − e−θ0ω(y)it ,
]
which implies:
∂yit
∂ω(y)it
=
1
2
[
eθ0ω(y)it + e−θ0ω(y)it ,
]
(9)
This derivative will differ for different values of yit, a property common to nonlinear models. In equa-
tion (10), we construct ∂Ynt/∂ω(Y )
′
nt, a diagonal matrix where its i
th diagonal element corresponds
to ∂yit/∂ω(y)it. To ease the interpretation, we will assess the partial derivative ∂Ynt/∂ω(Y )nt at
a given value of yit, for instance its median. For this particular case, equation (10) takes the
expression shown in equation (11).
∂Ynt
∂ω(Ynt)′
=
1
2

[
eθ0ω(y)1t + e−θ0ω(y)1t
] · · · 0
0
. . .
...
0 · · · [eθ0ω(y)nt + e−θ0ω(y)nt]
 (10)
∂Ynt
∂ω(Ynt)′
=
1
2
(
eθ0ω(ymed) + e−θ0ω(ymed)
)
In (11)
where ω(ymed) is the dependent variable evaluated at its median value, IHS-transformed. Fi-
nally, we obtain the matrix of impacts which measures the effect on the dependent variable (in
levels) of a change on the kth regressor as:
∂Ynt
∂X ′nt,k
= Sn,k(Wn) = (In − λ0Wn)−1 1
2
[
Inβk,0
(
eθ0ω(ymed) + e−θ0ω(ymed)
)]
(12)
As usual for spatial autoregressive models, this impact matrix is full due to the (In − λ0Wn)−1
term. The diagonal elements of Sn,k(Wn) represent direct effects, i.e. ∂yit/∂Xit,k. They are all
different from each other due to own-spillover effects, inherently heterogeneous due to differentiated
terms in Wn. This heterogeneity of direct effects is what Debarsy and Ertur (2010) call interactive
heterogeneity. Off-diagonal terms of Sn,k(Wn) represent indirect effects, ∂yit/∂Xjt,k, i.e. the effect
on the dependent variable of observation i due to a change in the kth regressor of observation j.
By contrast to non-spatial models where the impact of a change of a regressor on the dependent
variable is a scalar, in spatial autoregressive models we need to interpret a full matrix. To ease
interpretations, LeSage and Pace (2009) propose scalar measures which summarize the information
contained in impact matrices. They define the average direct effect as n−1 tr(Snk(Wn)), the average
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cumulated indirect effect as n−1ι′n (Sn,k(Wn)−Diag(Sn,k(Wn))) ιn where Diag(A) is a diagonal
matrix containing the diagonal elements of A, and the average total impact as n−1ι′n (Sn,k(Wn)) ιn.
The average total impact measures the effect on the dependent variable of an observation of a
change of the kth regressor in all observations, or alternatively the average effect on all observations
of a change in the kth regressor in one observation. The average cumulated indirect effect measures
the impact on all observations but i of a change in the kth regressor in observation i, or alternatively,
the impact on an given observation of a change in the kth regressor in all observations but the
concerned one.
The second type of impacts computation suggested by Pence (2006) consists in calculating the
effect of a unit change in the kth regressor on the percentage change of the dependent variable. This
interpretation is akin to that in a specification where the dependent variable is log-transformed.
Remembering the link between the IHS and log transformation, this interpretation is valid for large
values of the dependent variable. The matrix of partial semi-elasticities for a IHS-transformed SAR
specification is presented in equation (13).
∂ω(Ynt)
∂X ′nt,k
= (In − λ0Wn)−1Inβk ≈ 1
θ0
∂ ln(Ynt)
∂X ′nt,k
(13)
For large values of the dependent variable, the partial derivative of the IHS-transformed de-
pendent variable wrt. the kth regressor approximates the partial derivative of the log-transformed
dependent variable wrt. the same regressor, ignoring a multiplicative factor.
Properties of this impact matrix in terms of direct, indirect and total effects is the same as for
equation (12) and the summary scalar measures of LeSage and Pace (2009) can be used.
To draw inference regarding the statistical significance of the scalar summary measures, we
follow LeSage and Pace (2009) and construct there distribution using a large number of simulated
parameters drawn from the multivariate normal distribution of the parameters implied by the
maximum likelihood estimates.5 In a second step, we estimate credible confidence intervals for
each of the scalar measure of effects.
Expressions (12) and (13) assume a uniform (unit) change in the kth explanatory variable across
target countries (the term Inβk in both expressions). However, this homogeneity assumption may be
too strong, especially when countries are heterogeneous. Debarsy et al. (2016) propose to consider
heterogeneous variations of determinants, which may reflect changes more in line with the real
5We use 1000 simulations.
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world. For instance, if a determinant is more volatile in a first country than in a second, we can
expect the determinant change in the first country to be of higher magnitude than in the second.
Adapting the notations of Debarsy et al. (2016) to our case, we can extend expressions (12) and
(13) to account for heterogeneous changes in the kth determinant across countries. Expression (14)
presents marginal impacts using country specific variation of the kth determinant:
∂Ynt
∂X ′nt,k
= Sn,k(Wn) = (In − λ0Wn)−1 1
2
[
Ψkβk,0
(
eθ0ω(ymed) + e−θ0ω(ymed)
)]
(14)
where Ψk is a diagonal matrix with as typical diagonal element σ
i
k, the historical standard deviation
for the kth determinant of the ith target country. In this application, the standard deviation is based
on observations from 1999 to 2009.
Expression (15) presents semi-elasticities using country specific variation of the kth determinant:
∂ω(Ynt)
∂X ′nt,k
= (In − λ0Wn)−1Ψkβk (15)
For economic interpretations based on expressions (14) and (15), we do not use the scalar
summary measures of LeSage and Pace (2009) but we rely on a detailed country analysis since
impacts are much more heterogeneous across them.
3. Data and empirical specification
The regression concerns cross-border SWFs net flows for 43 host countries from 2004 to 2009.6
The econometric model to be estimated is a spatial panel data framework with country random
effects and the correction of Mundlak and is presented in equation (7). Ynt is the vector of SWFs’
cross-border net flows received by the 43 host countries of the sample at period t and ω(Y )nt is the
IHS transformed dependent variable.
One of the main challenge given to the research community on SWF is the lack of official data.
Despite the slight improvement over the years, SWFs as most financial investors have remained ex-
tremely reluctant to disclose a clear and comprehensive information about their portfolio allocation.
In this paper, we construct a novel database on SWF net flows.
For this, we follow Avendano (2010) and Avendano and Santiso (2009) who extract their in-
formation from the FactSet/LionShares database 7. FactSet is a major information source for
6The considered countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
7FactSet aquired LionShares in 2000
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institutional ownership and has become over the recent years an important source of information
for academic research (see for exemple Guerard et al. (2013)). The construction of the depen-
dent variable is described in Subsection 3.1. The set of considered determinants is described in
Subsection 3.2. Finally, the interaction matrices used are described in Subsection 3.3.
3.1. Dependent variable
We consider in our dependent variable equity cross-border SWFs net flows amount, excluding
investments and divestments made by local SWF in their own country. Amount are expressed in
millions of U.S. dollars. The sample consists of 27,968 (resp. 13,490) cross border investments
(resp. divestments) in public firms made by the 24 largest SWFs. The total foreign acquisition
(resp. sell) flows represents 425.4 (resp. 126.6) billions of U.S. dollars. We are careful to extract
investment data for both the SWFs and their subsidiaries, which we define as entities in which
SWF has at least a 50% ownership stake, following the literature (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2008;
Bernstein et al., 2009; Avendano, 2010; Megginson et al., 2013).
The 24 largest SWFs included in our sample hold in 2009 approximatively $5.93 trillion,8
representing 84% of total SWF holdings. We restrict our sample to the 2004-2009 period for
the sake of homogeneity of our sample as the economic and financial turbulences observed in the
aftermath of the Lehman brothers collapse and during the European sovereign debt crisis have
dramatically changed the financial environment and the behavior of financial investors. In this
respect, our analysis aims to shed light on the driving forces of SWF net flows in normal time.
We transform monthly holding data into share flows (acquisitions or sells) by computing the
difference between the number of positions hold by the SWF in a specific company at time t and at
time t−1. Then, we multiply this quantity by the average stock market price of the target firm for
the associated month in order to obtain the amount invested or divested.9 Eventually, we aggregate
this information across firms, months and SWFs for retrieving the annual net investments per
country which is designed to capture the attractiveness of the host countries. Descriptive statistics
of our dependent variable are presented in Table 1. At the host country level, we observe in Table
1 both negative and positive net flows amounts, which justifies the use of the IHS transformation.
8Sovereign Wealth Funds Institute.
9We consider the monthly average price instead of the one observed the day of the deal to mitigate the impact
of the acquisition or divestment on the stock market price (Fotak et al., 2008; Hesse and Sun, 2009; Dewenter et al.,
2010; Raymond, 2010; Fernandes, 2011; Kotter and Lel, 2011; Bortolotti et al., 2013).
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3.2. Explanatory variables
In this section, we detail the construction of the different explanatory variables used to estimate
the model as well as the expected effect on investments’ net flows. For the sake of clarity, the set
of variables is broken down into two groups: (i) those related to the economic development and (ii)
those related to the financial development.
Economic development is described as a sustainable increase in living standards of a certain
country or region inhabitants. Improvements in economic development is expected to increase host
country attractiveness for capitals. Our set of variables includes first host country ’s per capita
income, GDPCAP and growth (GDPCAPGWTH ). These two variables are expected to increase
the net flow of sovereign wealth funds capitals via the so-called wealth effect described in Knill et al.
(2012) and Megginson et al. (2013). Following Blonigen et al. (2007), we also include information on
skill endowments (SKILL), measured as the average years of schooling for those over age 25 (Barro
and Lee, 2001). The variable is only available at a low frequency with observations reported every
five years for 1965-2010. For the sake of consistency with the other series, we interpolate linearly
the value for the missing years. Domestic investments made by local SWF are added to the model
via the variable DOMFLOWS, to test whether cross-border SWFs investments are complementary
or substitute to domestic investments. In order to depict the level of economic investment in the
host country, we add the variable TOTINV, which is the ratio of the total net investment over GDP
(see Table 3). Finally, we include two measures of quality of the economic structure of the host
country in our model. The first one, RULELAW, captures the perceptions of the extend to which
agents have confidence in and abided by the rules of the society, and particularly in the quality
of contract enforcement and property rights. The second one, POLSTAB, assesses the political
stability of the country. Those two variables are expected to contribute positively to the country’s
attractiveness as they depict the quality of the institutional environment for the creditors.
The second set of explanatory variables is related to the financial development of the host
country. There are several reasons why better financial development should be beneficial for in-
ternational investors such as greater credibility, lower transaction costs or higher liquidity to say a
few. Three variables are used in the model to capture this dimension of the host economy. First, we
consider an indicator measuring the development of the financial intermediary services (FININT ),
equal to the sum of the liquid liabilities and the domestic credit to private sector over GDP.10 We
10Because of missing data, we linearly interpolated the liquid liabilities variable of 4 countries: Bahrain (2004 and
2007), Canada (2009), Chile (2004 to 2009) and Norway (2007 to 2009) and we interpolated the domestic credit to
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expect a positive impact of FININT on SWFs net flows since a sound financial system could make
it easier for an economy to absorb capitals from abroad. As second variable, we consider the MSCI
growth (MSCIGWTH ), which can be adequately summarized as a desire to get into the growing
financial market or alternatively to adopt a counter cyclical investment strategy in order to have the
opportunity to buy stocks at a lower price (“cheap market effect”). The final financial development
variable considered in our regression is the stock market volatility (STKMKTVOL), a measure
of uncertainty in financial markets.11 As such, we expect a negative impact of the host country
volatility on SWFs net flows. Finally, we include in our regression time-effects to account for the
presence of macroeconomic shocks. Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables are displayed in
Table 2.
As often done in macroeconomic studies, we lag all explanatory variables of one period to
mitigate possible endogeneity issues. Table 3 provides more details about the construction of
explanatory variables along with the expected effects.
3.3. Spatial interaction matrices
Accounting for spatial interactions in SWFs net flows requires the set up of an interaction
scheme, modeled through the use of an interaction (spatial weights) matrixWn. In this contribution,
we use three types of matrices to account for cross-sectional interactions between host nations.
The first considered way of modeling interactions between host countries consists in using geo-
graphical neighbors. The associated matrix of interactions is based on the square inverse distance
between host countries. To this end, we use the database from the CIA factbook website. In the
same spirit of Megginson et al. (2013); Knill et al. (2012); Avendano (2010) and Chhaochharia and
Laeven (2008) who analyze the effect of distance between SWF and host nations, we contribute to
the existing literature by investigating the effect of distance between host countries themselves on
capitals they attract from SWFs. Formally, this geographical interaction matrix is constructed as
follows:
wij =

0 if i = j
1
dij
2 otherwise
(16)
private sector variable for 2 countries: Canada (2009) and Norway (2007 to 2009).
11Because of missing data, we linearly interpolated the stock market volatility of 2 countries: Bahrain (2004) and
Morocco (2005).
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where dij is the arc-distance between capitals of countries i and j.
As presented in the introduction, interactions between host countries can be justified by the
economic closeness between these countries. Therefore, the second interaction scheme used is based
on bilateral trade flows. The elements of this matrix are constructed from bilateral monthly imports
and exports of host countries from 1998 to 2003 (72 observations), to avoid any endogeneity issues.
These bilateral data come from the IMF database and are expressed in USD. More precisely, the
interaction between each pair of host countries is constructed as follows:
wij =

0 if i = j
Xij+M ij
Xi.+M i.
otherwise
(17)
where Xij =
1
T
∑T
t=1Xij,t is the average exports over the period from country i to j , M ij =
1
T
∑T
t=1Mij,t represents the average imports of country i from j, Xi. =
1
T
∑T
t=1Xi.,t are the average
exports from country i to the rest of the world while M i. =
1
T
∑T
t=1Mi.,t are the average imports
of country i from the rest of the world.
Another argument relative to the high level of concentration of investments in international
asset allocation is related to the existence of privileged relationship between home country and host
country. The literature on foreign direct investment and international asset allocation emphasizes
the critical role of symmetric information (cost) and familiarity in explaining the spatial allocation
of international investments (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010). Accordingly, several studies focusing
on behavioral arguments for the existence of the home bias as well as over-investment in specific
foreign regions have suggested using language proximity as behavioral proxies (Solnik, 2008; Knill
et al., 2012; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2008). Therefore, the third considered interaction matrix
is based on this linguistic proximity. The matrix is constructed using the Common Language index
(CL) developed by Melitz and Toubal (2014). Their CL index is based on strictly on exogenous
linguistic factors and is constructed from three different indexes: Common Official Language (COL),
Common Native Language (CNL) and Language Proximity (LP). Their index ranges between 0
and 1. Formally, the elements of this interaction matrix take on the following form:
wij =

0 if i = j
CLij otherwise
(18)
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where CLij is the Common Language index value between host countries i and j.
All interaction matrices are normalized by their spectral radius (see Kelejian and Prucha,
2010).12
4. Results and discussion
In this section, we identify the factors improving host countries’ attractiveness for SWFs’ in-
vestments as well as the specific role of spatial interactions between host countries regarding their
allocation.
Table 4 contains the results of the estimation of model (7). Each column summarizes the results
for an interaction matrix. In the first column, we use the geographic distance interaction matrix; in
the second column, results are for the economic proximity based interaction matrix while the third
column reports the results when interactions are modeled through linguistic proximity. The Wald
test on the Mundlak correction variables (Table 4) shows that these control variables are jointly
statistically significant, implying a significant correlation between individual effects and regressors.
Estimation results show a negative and significant spatial autoregressive parameter λ, no matter
the interaction matrix used. Economically, such a result finds its justification in the “spatial
competition” between countries. Turning to the performance of the different specifications, it is
also noticeable that the likelihood value is higher for the linguistic proximity matrix. In the rest
of the paper we will therefore interpret the results obtained with this interaction matrix. We
also observe that the estimated coefficient of the IHS transformation, θˆ, is significantly different
from zero. This means that the transformed dependent variable is more adequate than the original
dependent variable to model the data (see MacKinnon and Magee, 1990). For comparison purposes,
estimation results using the original dependent variable are presented in Table 5. We first observe
a non-significant spatial autoregressive parameter, no matter the interaction matrix used. Besides,
we loose the significance of all but the stock market volatility and the skill variable. We also note
that the coefficient associated to the skill variable switched of sign. We finally remark that the
constant term becomes significant.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the IHS transformed SWFs net flows amounts with θ̂ = 0.042,
coming from the estimation of the model with the linguistic proximity interaction matrix (see
Table 4). We notice that the distribution of this variable looks much more like a normal distribution
12Interaction matrices are normalized to ensure the comparability of spatial autoregressive parameters coming from
different models.
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than the distribution of the original dependent variable, shown in Figure 1.
To analyze the effects of the determinants on SWFs net flows, we first rely on the marginal
impacts or semi-elasticities given by expressions (12) and (13) respectively and reported in Tables
6 and 7 for the linguistic proximity interaction matrix.13 These impacts assume an homogeneous
variation of determinant across countries To save on space, we only interpret the results in terms
of semi-elasticities, reported in Table 7.
Concerning direct impacts, we provide evidence that on average, SWFs net flows increase with
DOMFLOWS, GDPCAP, POLSTAB and FININT and decrease with SKILL and STKMKTVOL.
The positive direct effect of DOMFLOWS implies that domestic investments by local SWFs
are not made at the expense of foreign investments but act more as a complement. The findings
regarding to GDPCAP and FININT show that more mature economies - i.e. economies with higher
GDP per capita and sound financial market - tend to attract more investments. Political stability
of the host country is also a factor that positively contributes to the attractiveness. Conversely,
increased uncertainty in the financial environment as measured by high volatility in the local stock
market dampens SWF net flows. Eventually, everything been equal, countries with low skills
workers attract more capitals.
We now turn to the indirect impacts. These impacts measure the response of a change in a
determinant of one country on the SWF net flows in all other countries except the one in which the
variation has been implemented. Due to negative interactions between host countries, their sign will
be opposite to those obtained for direct effects. We note that the average indirect effects associated
to DOMFLOWS, GDPCAP, POLSTAB, SKILL, and FININT are statistically significant implying
that a variation in one of these variable in a country will affect SWF investment flows in all other
countries.
The presence of significant indirect effects supports the idea externatilities among receiving
countries : changes in the characteristics of a country has implications for the flows of capitals of
others as investors tend to reallocate their portfolios in reponse to financial and economic develop-
ments. Contrasting with other variables, it is worth noting that even though STKMKTVOL has a
significant negative direct effect on the attraction of SWFs capital, this variable does not have any
significant indirect effect.
13Marginal impacts and semi-elasticities for the geographic and economic proximity interaction matrices are quanti-
tatively and quantitatively similar to those obtained with the linguistic proximity interaction matrix and are available
upon request to the authors.
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Finally, we observe significant total effects for DOMFLOWS, SKILL, POLSTAB GDPCAP,
FININT and STKMKTVOL. The sign of these total effects are the same as those of direct effects,
but semi-elasticities are of lower magnitude, due to the dampening effect of indirect impacts.
Using country specific variations in the determinants, and thus relying on expressions (14)
and (15), we now report a more detailed analysis by investigating the direct and indirect semi-
elasticities of the FININT variable that is the one assessing the quality of financial intermediary
services infrastructure for each country.14 We also compare these results with those obtained
assuming homogeneous variation across target countries.
Figure 3 reports the direct semi-elasticities of the FININT variables for each country, assuming
an homogeneous unit increase of FININT. Even though these direct effects are theoretically hetero-
geneous, in this paper, we do not observe much heterogeneity between countries. However, in Figure
4, which represents direct semi-elasticities of an heterogeneous variation of FININT across target
countries, we observe a much higher heterogeneity, with the biggest impacts for Spain, Ireland and
Denmark. In other words, these three countries are the most reactive in terms of investments from
SWFs when their financial intermediary services vary. For instance, increasing Spanish FININT
by one percentage point leads to an increase in net investments from SWFs in Spain of 1.68%.
By contrast, in the homogeneous case, Norway, Sweden and Italy were the most reactive countries
to a change in their financial intermediary services. At the other end, we note that Mexico and
Indonesia have the smallest direct impact (0.009% for both) meaning that investments from SWF’s
in these country are the least reactive to a change in their FININT determinant.
One of the most interesting features of these interaction models concerns the explicit accounting
of indirect effects. Indeed, in the SAR model, affecting a determinant in a selected country will
affect SWF’s investment in all other countries. This characteristic is very important since we are
able to account for externalities due to a policy change in a country.
As for direct effects, we compare indirect semi-elasticities assuming either an homogeneous or
an heterogeneous variation in FININT. Figure 5 shows the cumulated indirect semi-elasticities for
each country assuming an homogeneous increase in FININT. As noted earlier, indirect effects are
negative since target countries are characterized by spatial competition. In this Figure, we already
note some heterogeneity: Countries that affect the least other countries are China and Hong-Kong
while variation in FININT in Norway, Sweden or Italy will affect the most all other countries.
14For the sake of place, we only focus on the FININT variable. However, all the results for all the other variables
and for the marginal impacts are available upon request to the authors.
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Figure 6 shows indirect semi-elasticities based on an heterogeneous variation of FININT across
target countries. Two main points need to be made. First, we observe a much pronounced
heterogeneity in these indirect semi-elasticities. While those based on homogeneous change in
FININT vary between −0.01 and −0.001, indirect semi-elasticities constructed from countries’
specific FININT changes vary between −0.433% and −0.005%. Second, countries with the highest
cumulated indirect effects are different. For the heterogeneous case, these are Denmark (−0.433%),
Netherlands (−0.354%) and Spain (−0.296%). These figures imply for instance that if the Danish
FININT increases by one standard deviation, the cumulated net divestments in all other countries
in the sample will be of 0.433%. In the homogeneous case, these countries are Norway, Sweden
and Italy. Also, countries for which changes in FININT affect the least all the other countries are
Indonesia (−0.005%) and Philippines (−0.007%).
Indirect semi-elasticities based on countries’ specific changes allow to assess more realistically
the impact of a change in a country’s determinant on the whole system, since the impact accounts
for the nature of the country (stable or unstable determinant). We believe these impacts are quite
useful for macroeconomic analysis.
5. Conclusions
This paper aims to shed light on the question of why some countries are more attractive for
SWFs cross-border investments than others and whether target countries sharing similarities are
set in competition to receive these capitals. To do so, we develop an original framework that quan-
tifies the specific role of spatial dependence in the location of SWFs’ investments on one side and
on the other side is robust to outliers while dealing with zero and negative values of investments
thanks to the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation to the dependent variable. More specifically,
the estimation procedure we propose is a random effects spatial autoregressive panel model with
an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformed dependent variable, where the possible correlation between
individual effects and regressors is accounted for through the use of the Mundlak approach. Three
interaction schemes are considered to model interactions between host countries. The first one is
based on geographic distance. The second one is the economic proximity which is captured by the
relative intensity of bilateral trade between countries. The third one reflects linguistic proximity.
Several insights emerge from our analysis. Hence, these results suggest that country-level variables
can affect sovereign wealth fund net flows and thereby potentially help contribute to growth. Coun-
tries with higher GDP per capita and Domestic flows tend to attract more SWFs capital. SWFs
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net flows also appear to depend on the level of the financial development captured by the ratio
of financial resources to the private sector over GDP. Besides, better political stability and higher
level of financial development of host country contribute positively to SWF’s investments net flows,
while stock market volatility has the opposite effect. Beyond that, at the system wide level, our
findings additionally show that these effects should not be considered in isolation. The spatial
autoregressive parameter is negative and significant for the three interaction matrices. In accor-
dance, there will be multilateral consequences in changes in countries characteristics, as investors
tend to reallocate their portfolios in response to financial and economic developments in neighbors
countries. The results are consistent with arguments that countries with close economic tights or
those sharing cultural similarities are set in competition. One way to interpret this result is that
once having the necessary information to invest in a bunch of neighboring countries, investors tend
to concentrate their investment in the one providing the most interesting perspectives. That being
said, this paper by taking the perspective of the host country does not provide a full insight of the
mechanisms at play and especially of how each sovereign wealth funds behave individually. This
issue and the necessary adjustment of the spatial models to be used in this case are left for future
research. Still, we make clear that the analysis of sovereign wealth funds net flows should take into
account country characteristics but also the externalities to other countries. From an econometric
perspective, the key insight from this paper is that we can adjust standard panel and spatial panel
model estimation procedure to apply of the IHS transformation. As discussed throughout the pa-
per, this transformation is very convenient to deal with the presence of outliers as well as null and
negative values of the dependent variable. There are obviously many research in macroeconomics
and finance such as modeling of foreign direct investment and trade that could benefit from this
transformation and the associated estimation procedure we propose.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the dependent variable ($ MM).
Country Average Std. Min Max Country Average Std. Min Max
Argentina 2.21 4.36 -1.13 10.70 Italy 701.52 607.87 141.73 1482.09
Australia 572.99 774.37 -270.75 1905.39 Jordan -224.90 1697.16 -3532.56 1154.33
Austria -542.52 1495.04 -3558.52 271.56 Malaysia 627.67 768.54 -693.08 1532.99
Bahrain 123.63 188.00 -35.29 470.27 Mexico 169.89 518.59 -715.90 602.33
Belgium 317.02 225.49 123.57 595.56 Morocco 2.79 6.90 -0.72 16.84
Brazil 550.07 650.10 -74.66 1757.37 Netherlands 352.82 552.07 -340.57 1286.46
Canada 1272.35 1413.31 277.52 4090.62 New Zealand 10.43 23.41 -28.17 34.47
Chile 22.17 74.06 -67.39 152.82 Norway 18.95 32.67 -3.23 82.65
China 1775.50 3400.16 -3093.65 6434.96 Peru 4.05 12.42 -5.37 28.87
Colombia 2.03 4.53 -0.56 11.22 Philippines 16.14 22.51 -2.54 55.27
Czech Republic 32.99 135.99 -159.62 258.97 Poland 51.99 134.19 -50.37 319.01
Denmark 411.80 896.63 -878.44 1770.00 Portugal 185.66 257.39 -98.61 551.87
Egypt -3.48 1054.45 -1772.92 1487.32 Russia 8150.54 18098.23 -999.35 44940.69
Finland 381.68 432.02 42.55 1062.37 Singapore 79.72 101.22 -51.79 186.42
France 2172.24 2755.57 -1658.63 6293.18 Spain 788.20 1134.91 -502.92 2509.58
Germany 4208.06 4144.35 388.17 11182.65 Sweden 441.16 401.93 -302.48 927.05
Greece 117.71 124.42 -8.07 327.54 Switzerland 3760.68 3205.73 1260.00 9891.49
Hong Kong 734.85 1328.26 52.13 3422.90 Thailand 345.78 671.99 -513.81 1468.03
Hungary 44.47 147.00 -114.71 303.92 Turkey 124.52 210.30 -24.85 500.61
Indonesia -303.27 1324.47 -2977.83 579.24 UK 6549.32 6699.62 471.87 15066.14
Ireland 64.64 201.14 -153.66 285.79 USA 15625.00 13656.56 6089.76 37272.06
Israel 58.58 107.17 -26.19 266.05
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for explanatory variables
Average Std. Min Max
DOMFLOWS ($ bil.) 0.21 1.32 -1.68 14.14
GDPCAP ($ M.) 22.56 17.96 1.12 67.80
GDPCAPGWTH (%) 3.10 2.64 -4.58 13.57
POLSTAB (*100) 21.83 93.44 -239.00 166.00
RULELAW (*100) 80.88 94.01 -95.00 200.00
SKILL (*100) 958.85 227.23 357.60 1330.46
TOTINVT (%) 23.28 4.79 14.26 43.78
FININT (%) 173.08 87.36 37.57 434.77
MSCIGWTH (%) 3.51 11.50 -36.78 25.20
STKMKTVOL 19.52 7.40 7.56 44.96
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Table 4: Results using IHS-transformed SWFs net flows amounts
Geo. Distance Economic Prox. Language Prox.
Economic Development
CST -32.033 -10.632 -13.482
(50.376) (52.830) (51.831)
DOMFLOWS 6.400∗∗ 6.334∗∗ 6.644∗∗
(2.885) (2.941) (2.950)
GDPCAP 10.277∗∗ 10.063∗∗ 11.079∗∗
(4.539) (4.613) (4.669)
GDPCAPGWTH -0.568 -0.504 -0.546
(2.567) (2.620) (2.624)
POLSTAB 0.372∗ 0.421∗ 0.421∗
(0.219) (0.223) (0.224)
RULELAW -0.243 -0.359 -0.264
(0.536) (0.544) (0.547)
SKILL -0.455∗∗ -0.475∗∗ -0.515∗∗
(0.214) (0.218) (0.220)
Financial Development
FININT 0.539∗∗ 0.543∗∗ 0.540∗∗
(0.228) (0.232) (0.232)
MSCIGWTH -0.625 -0.645 -0.636
(0.678) (0.692) (0.693)
STKMKTVOL -1.424∗ -1.428∗ -1.447∗
(0.811) (0.828) (0.829)
TOTINVT 0.527 0.754 0.687
(1.900) (1.935) (1.939)
Spatial autocorrelation
λ -0.474∗ -0.255∗ -0.351∗∗
(0.252) (0.145) (0.171)
IHS transformation
θ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs 258 258 258
Wald p-value 0.0042 0.0046 0.0021
Wald statistic 25.695 25.410 27.532
log-lik -1968.837 -1969.033 -1968.490
Time fixed effects yes yes yes
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level. Standard errors reported between brackets.
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Table 5: Results using original SWFs net flows amounts
Geo. Distance Economic Prox. Language Prox.
Economic Development
CST -5979.734∗ -5728.517∗ -5915.666∗
(-3311.664) (-3191.836) (-3336.546)
DOMFLOWS -274.697 -280.763 -273.101
(459.179) (469.874) (452.604)
GDPCAP 66.881 47.063 97.060
(-80.328) (-63.442) (-121.712)
GDPCAPGWTH -150.489 -134.270 -144.296
(-398.135) (-288.929) (-507.785)
POLSTAB 45.011 42.927 45.187
(-33.155) (-30.982) (-33.503)
RULELAW -22.502 -22.484 -22.689
(-106.6779) (-151.538) (-74.426)
SKILL 5.681∗ 6.996 4.290∗
(3.307) (5.280) (2.547)
Financial Development
FININT 27.317 21.066 26.791
(23.819) (16.914) (23.512)
MSCIGWTH 86.226∗ 85.806∗ 84.719∗
(-47.601) (-47.779) (-47.788)
STKMKTVOL 6.221∗∗∗ 12.144∗∗∗ 6.347∗∗∗
(2.125) (4.356) (2.159)
TOTINVT -242.066 -240.255 -236.986
(-2218.060) (-1130.270) (-2130.231)
λ -0.269 -0.146 -0.154
(0.192) (0.106) (0.111)
Obs 258 258 258
Wald statistic 6901.0928 8282.6847 9725.8458
Wald p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
log-lik -2491.317 -2490.138 -2491.306
Time fixed effects yes yes yes
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level. Standard errors reported between brackets.
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Table 6: Average Impacts on SWFs net flows amounts ($ Millions), evaluated at median ($125.64 Millions)
Language Prox.
Direct Impact Indirect Impact Total Impact
Economic Development
DOMFLOWS 35.746∗∗ -5.795∗∗ 29.952∗∗
(9.349;62.781) (-11.935;-0.686) (7.965;53.042)
GDPCAP 59.608∗∗ -9.663∗∗ 49.945∗∗
(19.457;101.582) (-20.851;-0.975) (16.433;84.561)
GDPCAPGWTH -2.939 0.477 -2.463
(-23.957;19.701) (-3.567;4.122) (-20.506;16.035)
POLSTAB 2.267∗ -0.368∗ 1.9∗
(0.31;4.112) (-0.808;-0.008) (0.24;3.563)
RULELAW -1.421 0.23 -1.191
(-6.222;3.468) (-0.597;1.112) (-5.239;2.882)
SKILL -2.771∗∗ 0.449∗ -2.322∗∗
(-4.647;-0.788) (0.042;0.948) (-3.865;-0.659)
Financial Development
FININT 2.905∗∗ -0.471∗∗ 2.434∗∗
(0.945;4.867) (-0.981;-0.05) (0.802;4.119)
MSCIGWTH -3.424 0.555 -2.869
(-9.436;2.57) (-0.426;1.746) (-7.921;2.146)
STKMKTVOL -7.783∗ 1.262 -6.521∗
(-15.434;-0.23) (-0.045;2.83) (-13.37;-0.172)
TOTINVT 3.695 -0.599 3.096
(-14.292;20.162) (-3.609;2.383) (-11.704;16.853)
***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level. 10% confidence interval reported between brackets.
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Table 7: Semi-Elasticities (%)
Language Prox.
Direct Impact Indirect Impact Total Impact
Economic Development
DOMFLOWS 0.280∗∗ -0.045∗∗ 0.234∗∗
(0.073;0.491) (-0.093;-0.005) (0.062;0.414)
GDPCAP 0.466∗∗ -0.076∗∗ 0.391∗∗
(0.152;0.794) (-0.163;-0.008) (0.128;0.661)
GDPCAPGWTH -0.023 0.004 -0.019
(-0.187;0.154) (-0.028;0.032) (-0.16;0.125)
POLSTAB 0.018∗ -0.003∗ 0.015∗
(0.002;0.032) (-0.006;-0.0001) (0.002;0.028)
RULELAW -0.011 0.002 -0.009
(-0.049;0.027) (-0.005;0.009) (-0.041;0.023)
SKILL -0.022∗∗ 0.004∗ -0.018∗∗
(-0.036;-0.006) (0.0003;0.007) (-0.03;-0.005)
Financial Development
FININT 0.023∗∗ -0.004∗∗ 0.019∗∗
(0.007;0.038) (-0.008;-0.0004) (0.006;0.032)
MSCIGWTH -0.027 0.004 -0.022
(-0.073;0.02) (-0.003;0.014) (-0.062;0.017)
STKMKTVOL -0.061∗ 0.01 -0.051∗
(-0.12;-0.002) (-0.0004;0.022) (-0.104;-0.001)
TOTINVT 0.029 -0.005 0.024
(-0.112;0.158) (-0.028;0.019) (-0.091;0.131)
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level. 10% confidence interval reported between brackets.
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Figure 1: Foreign SWFs net flows amount
Figure 2: Foreign SWFs net flows amounts IHS
transformed with θˆ = 0.0420
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Figure 3: Standard direct semi-elasticities for FININT
Figure 4: “Reality based” direct semi-elasticities for FININT
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Figure 5: Standard indirect semi-elasticities for FININT
Figure 6: “Reality based” Indirect semi-elasticities for FININT
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